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The Employment Relation from the Transactions Cost 
Perspective 
Arnold Picot and Ekkehard Wenger 
Abstract 
The transactions cost perspective rests on the assumption that utility-maximizing indi-
viduals seek for efficient solutions of organizational problems by contractual exchange 
of property rights. Unlike models of perfect markets it takes account of the fact that the 
operation of a pricing system is not without cost. Consequently, spot market coordina-
tion may be inefficient, because its transactions costs exceed those of other modes of 
contracting. This is especially true for specialized labor inputs, which for various 
reasons cannot be contracted in infinitesimal quantities on sequential spot markets. 
Hence, an employment relation emerges, which economizes on transactions costs by 
mutual agreement on a range of decisions submitted to the employer's authority. 
In the absence of legal restraints, employment contracts are usually characterized by 
the reciprocal right of short-term cancellation, even though in the normal course of 
events sunk costs incurred during the initial contract period would make it detrimental 
to both parties to discontinue employment. Common belief that employees are "ex-
ploited" under unrestricted freedom of contract resulted in the adoption of various 
statutory measures, such as legally imposed protection against unfair dismissal, union 
privileges, or mandatory codetermination. The resulting alternative contract structures 
are compared with the traditional labor contract in terms of transactions costs. 
1. The Transactions Cost Perspective as a Ramification of 
Neoclassical Economics 
The transactions cost perspective rests on the assumption that utility-maximizing indi-
viduals seek for efficient solutions of organizational problems by contractual exchange 
of property rights. Under certain assumptions it can be shown that perfect and com-
plete markets provide an efficient solution to such problems. This is the basic proposi-
tion of neoclassical economic theory which is usually referring to an analytical 
framework expounded by K. J. Arrow (1964) and G . Debreu (1959). Within an Arrow-
Debreu-world, trade of contingent claims completely specified for every state of nature 
will lead to a Pareto-efficient allocation of resources, including an optimal distribution 
of risk. 
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Of course, the viability of such a solution to organizational problems depends on the 
assumption that the operation of a pricing system is without cost. If this assumption is 
abandoned, trade of contingent claims may be inferior to other modes of contracting. 
Costs of observing an agent's behavior, costs of unambiguously specifying the state of 
nature, and costs of drawing and enforcing contracts must be taken into account. As a 
consequence of such "transactions costs" organizational problems will emerge which 
cannot exist within the framework of an Arrow-Debreu-world; their explanation and 
optimal solution require a ramification of conventional neoclassical analysis by adopt-
ing a transactions cost perspective: alternative solutions to organizational problems are 
to be compared in terms of transactions costs. This is the basic proposition underlying 
two seminal papers of R. H . Coase (1937, 1960). 
It has to be stressed that transactions costs are not necessarily costs that materialize in 
net cash outlays; all kinds of disadvantages associated with different modes of contract-
ing, e.g. time consumption or enforcement efforts, have to be taken into account. To be 
sure, such non-financial costs have to be converted into a financial cost equivalent, if an 
evaluation of different forms of economic organization is to be performed in monetary 
terms; consequently, a correct and all-inclusive calculation of relevant transactions 
costs often meets with evaluation problems which can not be solved without relying on 
rough and ready guesses. Anyway, it would be foolish to ignore non-financial transac-
tions costs because of computational problems or to disregard the existence of trade-
offs between financial and non-financial burdens (Picot 1982: 271). Moreover, compu-
tational problems are not specific to non-financial burdens; under uncertainty, even the 
amount of future cash flows cannot exactly be calculated in advance. Every decision is 
based on more or less informed guesses; the rule that it is better to be vaguely right than 
precisely wrong applies to the transactions cost perspective as well as everywhere. 
Another problem with the transactions cost perspective is equally pervasive. Speaking 
of costs, it does not make sense to evaluate "all" costs; what matters are only "relev-
ant" costs that are affected by the decision in question. Hence, transactions costs need 
not be taken into account if they are "sunk" costs of former decisions. Costs of drawing 
a statutory law already in effect are irrelevant for activities of single business firms 
operating in an established legal environment; likewise costs of an existing organiza-
tional form of an enterprise are sunk costs with respect to subordinate agreements with 
single employees. Thus, transactions costs have always to be related to specific deci-
sions or decision levels, with due regard to the consequences for subordinate decisions, 
if decisions on a higher level are taken. Hence, an evaluation of the costs of establishing 
a legal framework has to anticipate the transactions costs incurred by business firms 
engaging in contractual exchange within the framework in question (Michaelis and 
Picot 1987: 87-88). 
After all, the transactions cost perspective is a starting point for a unified economic 
theory of organization, including both the micro- and the macro-level. To be sure, its 
explanatory power is neither unlimited nor equally distributed among different organi-
zational problems; especially basic institutional changes, such as the French Revolution 
or the abolition of serfdom and slavery, cannot satisfactorily be explained from the 
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transactions cost perspective, at least not by now. But there is neither an economic nor 
a non-economic approach that offers a superior, much less a satisfying, explanation for 
such "macrosociological" phenomena without recourse to ad-hoc arguments (Domar 
and Machina 1984, Schüller 1985: 263, Stigler, 1984). If elimination of a theory requires 
a superior one, a transactions cost perspective may be helpful even in the analysis of 
basic institutional change, as long as no one in the social sciences can present a positive 
theory of the state that offers a satisfying explanation for phenomena of the kind 
mentioned above. Much less is there any reason to exempt the political system and its 
decisions from economic analysis - neither from a positive nor from a normative point 
of view. 
This may seem far-fetched when it comes to an analysis of the employment relation; but 
it has to be borne in mind that the employment relation is one of the main targets of 
government regulation. Not only in most industrialized states but also in ancient and 
medieval societies the free exchange of private property rights in labour has been 
subject to severe restrictions imposed by authoritarian rulers, peer groups with legal 
privileges, or governments supported by majority voting. High enforcement costs and 
high violation rates notwithstanding, many of these restrictions have survived over 
decades or even centuries, and their final abolition was frequently accompanied by 
heavy shocks or breakdown of the political system. The interplay of special-interest 
coalitions, which lies at the heart of labor market regulation, has been analyzed else-
where (Olson 1982); hence, the remaining parts of the paper do not deal with the 
evolution of institutional restraints governing the employment relation but concentrate 
upon how employers and employees adapt individually to a given legal framework. 
Individually optimal adaptation, of course, should not be mistaken for compliance, as is 
evident from a prospering shadow economy in heavily regulated environments; 
nevertheless, the shadow economy differs from the respective parts of a free labor 
market, because there is no recourse to the courts if a breach of contract occurs. 
The next section explains the dominant mode of labor contracting under a regime of 
free exchange in terms of transactions costs; the subsequent and last section of the 
paper deals with the consequences of modern labor law. 
2. The Employment Relation in Free Labor Markets 
From the beginning, transactions cost analysis found its most important application 
field in the employment relation (Coase 1937, Williamson et al. 1975). It is here where 
the deviation of empirical contract structures from contingent claim trading is most 
striking; not even sequential spot markets, which under certain circumstances serve as a 
perfect subsitute for contingent claims, bear any close resemblance to substantial parts 
of the labor market. Consequently, contracts are not devised as an exchange of com-
pletely specified goods or services; instead, the parties to the contract agree ex ante, 
i.e. when the contract is drawn, upon the distribution of decision rights to be exercised 
ex post (Wenger 1984). This can easily be interpreted in terms of transactions costs. As 
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it is prohibitively costly to anticipate all contingencies and the optimal actions of the 
coalition members when they enter into the employment relation, the implementation 
of the contract in concrete instances will be determined by decisions which will be taken 
according to the decision rights agreed upon initially. This later implementation 
necessarily carries distributive risks or even the danger of open distributional struggle, 
but has to be accepted as a flexible tool for coping with unanticipated changes in 
environmental conditions. 
Labor contracts in a free market setting are usually characterized by the reciprocal right 
of short-term cancellation and the clear-cut authority of the employer. The employer's 
authority would be of no account, if the signing of labor contracts did not presuppose 
sunk costs and, therefore, require a longer pay-off period. Otherwise, labor services 
would be contracted in infinitesimal quantities on sequential spot markets involving no 
need for the employer's discretionary authority. But because sunk costs arise at the 
beginning of the employment relation, it is mutually advantageous for both contracting 
parties not to discontinue employment in the normal course of events. Nevertheless, 
the parties insist on the right of short-term termination which reflects the transactions 
cost of anticipating exactly those conditions under which a future continuation of the 
labor contract will be disadvantageous for either one of the parties. 
The unilateral right to terminate the contract suggests that the employee is always able 
to secure at least the distributional position offered by the next best alternative. With-
out sunk costs, this would be sufficient to protect the worker's interests, because he 
would not have been better off without accepting the contract. With sunk costs to be 
borne by the workers, however, a mutually advantageous labor contract has to offer a 
wage differential over the next best post-contractual employment alternative. This 
quasi-rent1 is the financial source for the amortization of their proportionate sunk cost 
components. Here, the right to terminate the contract is an inadequate protection for 
the employee, and there is no economic justification for the employer's bargaining 
power to appropriate the employee's surplus over the next best alternative by extorting 
wage concessions or by excessive use of discretionary power. Under unrestricted entre-
preneurial power to redistribute cooperative rents at the expense of incumbent employ-
ees, the latter could not be induced to take over sunk costs. This may lead to the 
consequence that rents from team production, which could be created under a superior 
contractual arrangement, must be foregone. If this is true, both employer and employee 
have a vital interest in the protection of the latter's quasi-rents. 
If employees have protective rights, however, there is no guarantee that these rights 
cannot be exercised in order to expropriate the employer. Protection against dismissal, 
for example, may reduce work incentives, because the employer can not fire a worker 
"at wi l l " 2 , but is dependent on a complicated legal procedure which increases transac-
tions costs of discriminating against low performers. The ensuing moral hazard prob-
lems are a strong argument in favor of short-term termination rights. Hence, control of 
behavior and performance in free labor markets is predominantly based on "exit", 
when it comes to the well-known distinction between "exit" and "voice" coined by 
Hirschman (1970). 
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To be sure, an important school of management literature believes that moral hazard 
problems of free labor contracts may be solved more efficiently by trust relations and 
common values of industrial clans with long-term stability, in which employees' 
''psychological success and emotional well-being" should be assured (Ouchi and Price 
1978). This is the basic message of "Theory Z " (Ouchi 1981). It has to be noted, 
however, that mutual trust is not a viable organizational device, if a breach of trust is 
individually rational. Hence, it is extremely difficult to establish a viable long-term trust 
relation without short-term termination rights. As game theory tells us, problems of the 
prisoner dilemma type can be solved in repeated game-situations, if the value of the 
first round is sufficiently low in relation to the net present value of all future repetitions 
(Taylor 1976). Consequently, bargaining within employment relations, where both 
parties have an interest in preserving their respective quasi-rents, may lead to efficient 
results only if either side is entitled to short-term exit, a provision that reduces the value 
of the first round, thereby destroying either side's incentives to cheat (Wenger 1984). 
Other deterrents against cheating certainly do exist, as is shown by Theory Z with its 
close resemblance to "medieval views that bound men tightly to social institutions" 
(Sullivan 1983; 140). Wages rising with seniority, which render the worker's exit option 
void, enable Japanese firms to exert heavy pressure on individual employees, thereby 
reducing incentives to shirk; but it is very doubtful that this is a pareto-efficient solu-
tion, as long as the industrial clan in its Japanese version is associated with high levels of 
dissatisfaction, stress, mental illness, and even suicide rates,3 as well as an "unfair 
cleavage between regular and subcontract workers" (Koshiro 1983: 83). Moreover, 
regular workers with life-time commitment and end-loaded wage profiles are underpaid 
for approximately two decades in exchange for uncertain seniority wages beyond the 
age of fourty. The pretended "trust relation" with their employer firm offers no protec-
tion against non-systematic risks in a competitive environment. When the so-called 
"Japanese employment system" had to pass its first major test, i.e. the oil shock of the 
mid-seventies, "big firms [...] introduced quite an unusual practice [...] (and) singled 
out middle-aged employees with long-term service [...] and forced (!) them to take up 
voluntary (!) resignation" (Tsuda 1982: 208-209). How firms handled the "trust rela-
tion" with their workers may be illustrated by quoting the president of a leading textile 
firm, who explained the reason for the dismissal of long-term employees as follows: 
"When a ship is about to be wrecked, heavier cargoes should be thrown off first to sea" 
(quotation from Tsuda 1982: 206). 
After all, there is no evidence that clans with medieval attributes embody an efficient 
solution to organizational problems of employment relationships within a competitive 
dynamic environment. Under mutual termination rights there are better opportunities 
to pursue individual preferences and to reduce both shirking and excessive use of 
discretionary power. Recent developments in Japan seem to conform with this hy-
pothesis: social customs associated with clan organization are eroding, whereas the exit 
option is gaining significance even in the primary segment of the labor market, where 
stable long-term relationships have long been governed by the rules of the "Japanese 
employment system" (Wirtschaftswoche 1986, 1987). 
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Nevertheless, the predominance of termination rights as a cost-minimizing device lead-
ing to efficient contract structures in a free labor market does not imply optimality of an 
unrestricted hire and fire policy; whenever workers receive quasi-rents in exchange for 
their burden of sunk costs, the optimal degree of worker protection is different from 
zero. Hence, even in free labor markets some protective devices may evolve; even if 
transactions costs of legal claims may be prohibitive, social customs induce rational 
employers to avoid arbitrary dismissals, because they do not want to jeopardize their 
reputation. It has to be borne in mind, however, that it is not at all clear to what degree 
social customs protecting incumbent workers and supporting the "internalization of 
labor markets" (Elbaum 1983) would have evolved in truly free markets without union 
privileges4; hence the traditional structure of labor contracts, which for the most part 
has not explicitly been imposed by law, cannot easily be interpreted as a free market 
solution, because the mere presence of union privileges may suffice to change the 
evolution of other labor market institutions. There is every reason to believe that 
workers' shares of sunk costs and, hence, the need to protect their quasi-rents are 
rather small in non-unionized settings and increase markedly with union power, be-
cause employers are forced to shift the burden of specialized investments at least in part 
to the workers, if unionization and strike activities cannot be prevented (Monissen and 
Wenger 1987). Consequently, what can be observed in unionized, but otherwise unre-
gulated markets as traditional contract structure amounts to an overstatement of work-
ers' protective needs in non-unionized settings. Nevertheless, some of the features of 
the traditional labor contract may even survive a complete abrogation of union 
privileges. 
Under the traditional labour contract workers' quasi-rents are partly protected by 
restricting the discretionary authority of the employer with respect to content and 
powers of decision. More important, the contracted wage level is agreed upon for a 
minimum contract duration with the further implicit or explicit stipulation that the 
wages are fixed from below, possibly in nominal terms but usually relative to a general 
trend of wages as stipulated by a union contract. Wage reductions for an individual 
employee are regarded as a breach of the implicit agreement, unless his performance is 
much lower than expected or his old job becomes redundant; even then, however, they 
are very likely to be avoided because of a strong tendency in favor of a dismissal. With 
zero transactions cost, this would often be an inefficient solution; but if bad perform-
ance is costly to detect and verify, finely tuned wage reductions may be inferior to an 
"all or nothing" solution, because the latter has at least two favorable consequences: on 
the one hand, the worker faces a small probability of a high penalty, a provision which 
allows to reduce costly control activities; on the other hand, the employer is prevented 
from redistribution by unjustified wage cuts. 
To prevent unjustified redistribution is also necessary with respect to general wage cuts 
affecting the whole work-force of a firm. Such wage cuts may be desirable, when a firm 
faces extraordinarily poor business conditons. In such settings continued employment 
may conflict with the economic interest of the employer, unless the work-force is ready 
to give up a part of their quasi-rents. With sufficient wage cuts, however, Pareto-
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efficient employment relations may be preserved. But if wage cuts must be made 
dependent upon credible signs of the employer's financial difficulties, it may happen 
that with asymmetric information and high transactions costs of removing informational 
asymmetries, wage reductions can not be realized without dismissal of a part of the 
work-force. The destruction of specific capital could become an inevitable consequence 
(Hart 1983). Thus, an excess sensitivity of dismissals to business fluctuations may at 
least partly be explained by transactions costs (Hall and Lazear 1984). 
The terms of the traditional labor contract, therefore, do not exclude the possibility 
that the quasi-rents of employees will be annihilated by ex-post involuntary dismissals. 
3. The Employment Relation under Modern Labor Law 
The weak protection of workers' quasi-rents induced governments all over the world to 
restrain freedom of contract by law. Especially in Western Europe mandatory codeter-
mination and legal restraints of the employer's right to dismiss are pervasive. One of 
the popular arguments is based on alleged distortions of the entrepreneurial decision 
calculus which is supposed to yield inefficient results, because the net present value of 
decisions affecting the work-force "does not include" the discounted stream of quasi-
rents destroyed by dismissals of employees. As has been explained above, however, it is 
not a capitalistic management which is responsible for inefficient dismissals, but the 
transactions costs of ex-post bargaining for wage reductions. It has to be noted that free 
negotiation in the absence of transactions costs implies that the employment contract 
will be terminated only if both parties concerned explicitly consent. Unilateral termina-
tion will not occur as long as the other party is prepared to make sufficient concessions 
in order to avert the necessity to realize less advantageous alternatives outside the firm. 
Under these circumstances all decisions to terminate employment will be Pareto-effi-
cient and never occur against the will of the dismissed party. Only if renegotiation of 
the contract is characterized by high transactions costs or legally imposed restraints, 
labor-saving investment decisions may, on balance, have a negative effect. Hence, we 
can draw an important conclusion: in the absence of transactions costs rights of employ-
ees do not change the efficiency of decisions in ex-post situations; what may be affected 
is the efficiency of risk allocation in ex-ante situations, because protective rights bear 
upon the distribution of gains or losses in different ex-post situations5. For these 
reasons it is obvious, that codetermination or protection against dismissal cannot have 
socially desirable consequences, unless they allow economizing on transactions costs or 
improve the allocation of risk. 
As far as transactions costs are concerned, it is not at all clear why codetermination or 
dismissal protection should solve problems that cannot be solved in a free market 
setting. Transactions costs, that prevent a perfect protection of employees' quasi-rents 
in free labor markets, cannot be assumed away only because protective rights are 
imposed; the major problems of a protection of quasi-rents remain unchanged, at least 
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in principle. Costs of continuously assessing employment alternatives outside the firm 
have to be borne in any institutional setting, if a destruction of quasi-rents were to be 
excluded; the same is true for the interest of employees to understate their surplus over 
the next best alternative in order to improve their bargaining position within the firm 
(Monissen and Wenger 1987). Obviously, if employees were to continously reveal their 
true estimates to the employer, he would always know how much concessions he could 
extort from the employees, and labor's share would be always endangered. Just as 
much is there reason for the employer to conceal his own share of quasi-rents. Of 
course, the willingness of either side to reveal its true estimate will rapidly increase, if 
the other party announces a termination decision; but with or without codetermination, 
the resulting flow of information will come too late, if the decision has already required 
a longer planning period. As far as, for example, labor-saving investments are con-
cerned, costly precommitments often prevent a reconsideration of the investment deci-
sion, even if a lower wage rate is part of a revised decision calculus. 
Even if all these problems of asymmetric information were reduced6 under an extensive 
codetermination scheme including long-term corporate planning, as some authors in-
deed do believe but cannot prove (e.g. Schneider 1983), such an improvement would 
have to be traded off against the increased costs of ex-post settlements associated with a 
suspension of termination rights. Whereas termination rights set predictable limits to 
the possible extent of distributional conflict, there are no such limits, if the parties are 
bound together by an obligation to bargain until a solution is accepted unanimously. 
Suspension of termination rights, therefore, results in permanent haggling. As a conse-
quence, complicated arbitration procedures7 and increased litigation with high costs of 
conflict resolution can be observed8. In such an environment there are strong incentives 
to redirect the decision-making authority of labor's representatives by granting pecuni-
ary or non-pecuniary allotments at the cost of represented employees9. 
But even more important are consequences which are not visible at the firm level but 
dispersed among customers and suppliers. By "protecting" the quasi-rents of the em-
ployees in one specific firm, the quasi-rents in related firms are completely ignored. If 
the costs of specific human capital are generally protected by blocking labor-saving 
investments, it is in the first instance to the disadvantage of the related investment 
industry, if the latter is characterized by a high degree of specific human and non-
human capital. As specificity seems to be very likely in investment industries, the 
protection of quasi-rents in customer firms would destroy quasi-rents in these indus-
tries. The argument in favor of protecting quasi-rents by codetermination rights auto-
matically raises a dilemma. Should everybody's quasi-rents be protected by granting 
decision rights, or can an economically justified criterion be presented in order to 
discriminate against quasi-rents of minor social importance which do not substantiate 
decision rights? 
Protecting all quasi-rents over and above scarcity values by decision rights will finally 
endanger an economic system based on decentralized decision-making. Within a net of 
interrelated economic activities the result would be tantamount to the situation where 
everyone decides on everything. The transactions costs of such an arrangement are 
The Employment Relation from the Transactions Cost Perspective 37 
certainly higher than the occasional destruction of quasi-rents by labor saving invest-
ment projects. For this reason, it has to be gratefully accepted that the legal systems in 
the western world have very wisely refrained from protecting the market value of 
positions endagered by the competitive forces of open markets (Buchanan and Faith 
1982). If this basic principle of economic organization were abandoned by substituting 
pervasive codetermination for contractual termination rights, the transactions costs of 
economic change and progress in general would tend to become prohibitive. 
There remains the question of whether the suspension of termination rights in labor 
contracts can be justified by a criterion that discriminates in favor of employees' quasi-
rents, whereas other quasi-rents of minor social importance should be exposed to 
termination rights. But even if one ignores the "narrow" economic efficiency calculus 
of optimal allocation and concentrates entirely on income shares, codetermination 
rights protecting employees in particular seem at variance with distributive justice. If 
one relied, for example, on the popular criterion of ranking the degree of direct mate-
rial disadvantage, ohne should draw attention to the fact that the annihilation of firm-
specific human capital with the ensuing income losses is very often less important than 
the general economic consequences of a fall in local real estate values or the collapse or 
decline of smaller local business firms. This suggests that in the case of a shut-down of a 
major factory the terms of agreement should not be negotiated with workers' represen-
tatives but with the authorities of the country or community affected. Efficiency consid-
erations, however, are not fully reflected in such arrangements, if they are imposed on 
firms ex-post; optimal contracting and allocation require negotiations before a major 
firm settles down. Consequently, it does not seem to be economically desirable to rely 
on codetermination rights imposed by a central government but to enforce competition 
among municipal or regional authorities designing optimal investment incentives for 
immigrating firms. In the United States competition between states seems to prevent 
what centralized legislation in German labor law has achieved on behalf of pretended 
interests of workers. Of course, such competition is emphatically deplored by advocates 
of labor market regulation (Harrison 1984: 403), but there is no economic argument 
why governments should not be forced to compete for citizens and taxpayers, as are 
business firms trying to attract workers or consumers. In fact, emigration, as a termina-
tion right of last resort, is an indispensable weapon for business firms and individuals to 
defend themselves against failures of the political system. 
If a suspension of termination rights seems to be highly questionable from a transac-
tions cost perspective, there may still be considerations of risk allocation speaking in 
favor of worker protection. Though the related problems are beyond the subject of this 
paper, some concluding remarks on the efficiency of risk allocation may be helpful. 
It has to be borne in mind that there is no reason to expect that codetermination rights 
will only be exercised to maintain the status quo 1 0. It is indeed very likely that potential 
increases in the companie's market value that depend on decisions which are subject to 
codetermination will be appropriated by the workers, at least in part. The ultimate 
consequence will be that any change in business policy not initially anticipated has to be 
paid for by sufficiently large concessions to the workers. This will be reflected in a 
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reduction of initial wages, which will, of course, grow over time as long as market 
conditions prove favorable. A wage level once attained tends to be protected, unless 
the firm goes bankrupt, and, consequently, the overall probability of wage cuts may be 
reduced in comparison with a system without protective rights. But this is not an 
improvement of risk allocation; to consider a wage reduction as a risk is tantamount to 
a nonsense concept of risk. A n anticipated reduction in the wages of older workers, 
which would be the only adequate consequence of a sure drop in performance, is no 
risk at a l l 1 1 . Protection of older workers against wage cuts, which is a widely accepted 
goal of union policy today1 2, produces just those quasi-rents, which compensate work-
ers for a specialized investment in form of wages below productivity during the first half 
of the work-life. Consequently, in labor markets, where no gifts are provided, protective 
rights for older workers increase the risk defined in an economically correct sense, 
i.e. risk in terms of the present value of life-time income. The worker who happens 
to join a company experiencing unanticipated favorable results will enjoy steadily 
increasing wage levels. In contrast, a worker starting his employment career with a firm 
which goes bankrupt after some time will lose a substantial part of the expected value of 
his life-time income. Thus, the lowering of the misspecified "risk" of wage reductions in 
consequence of protective codetermination rights has to be traded off for a sizeable 
increase in the risk of human capital as related to a worker's life-cycle. The intensified 
exposure to firm-specific (non-systematic) risk brought about by codetermination rights 
is certainly not in the interest of a representative worker entering the labor market. 
Payment of wages according to the life-cycle of worker performance would consider-
ably reduce quasi-rents of employees, and the unavoidable transactions costs of their 
protection would not have as detrimental consequences as today and in the years to 
come. 
Appendix: Discussion 
During the discussion at the conference, a vast range of problems lying beyond the 
scope of the paper was touched. As a consequence, it proved impossible to integrate 
more than a few contributions of the discussants into the final version of the written 
text. As a substitute, we comment separately on some selected points. 
1. Economic imperialism was one of the main subjects of the discussion. According to a 
major fraction of the participants, political solutions based on democratic values, such 
as mandatory codetermination, should not be judged from a "narrow" economic view-
point. The "narrow" economic viewpoint, however, respects individual preferences 
which can be easily overridden by "political solutions". The quality of "political solu-
tions" varies considerably, as the example of the Soviet Union, perhaps the most 
important "political solution", shows. To be sure, western democracies leave more 
room for the pursuit of individual preferences; but even here, there is every reason to 
distrust political solutions of problems that can be solved in the marketplace. The 
detrimental effects of special interest coalitions capturing the political system of west-
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ern democracies has well been documented by Olson (1982); as to West Germany in 
particular, cases like "Flick" or "Neue Heimat" or the all-embracing involvement of 
political parties in tax fraud activities raise serious doubts as to whether the agents 
within the political system are trustworthy representatives of the voters. Political solu-
tions based on "democratic values", therefore, do not necessarily work in the interest 
of voters and are often nothing more than a failure of the political system of representa-
tive democracy. Mandatory codetermination, for example, was never a primary goal of 
workers but was heavily promoted by union officials and their allies in the political 
parties, who could expect institutional support for their organization as well as addi-
tional influence and income sources from regulated labor markets. It is important to 
note that under direct democracy, where voters decide on political issues themselves, 
political agents cannot as easily indulge in their preferences for regulation; hence it is 
not surprising that in Switzerland, a stronghold of direct democracy, the people voted 
against mandatory codetermination by a margin of more than 2:1. Direct democracy 
within the political system apparently works against "democratization" of the economy 
(Brauchlin 1981: 90, 101). It supports the "narrow" economic viewpoint against demo-
cratic folklore. 1 3 
2. The debate on economic imperialism resulted in a general critique of the "commer-
cialization" of social relations. Some discussants feared that worker motivation and 
trust would be destroyed if the employment relation were "commercialized"; another 
discussant was very displeased with Chicago economists interpreting marriage as a long-
term contract or comparing protective services of the state with those of the Mafia. 
Trust, love, democracy, and social peace were stressed as basic principles instead of the 
profane economic concept of exchange. 
Alas, we do not live in the best of all worlds. Not even the Roman Catholic Church 
does rely on trust, but rotates the clergy among parishes in order to prevent the 
development of trusting relations detrimental to the employer (Faith et al. 1984). Love 
is neither a necessary nor a sufficient ingredient of marriage which for good reasons is 
organized as a contract with termination rights. Even where love exists, it is not free of 
considerations of exchange and genetically determined self-interest (Becker 1981, 
McKenzie and Tullock 1984): a wealthy good-looking prince will rarely fall in love with 
a blind, ugly scar-faced amputee unable to bear children. Moreover, many societies do 
not accept that a couple marries, simply because they love each other. 
As to democracy and social peace, there is no reason for moral arrogance with respect 
to different political systems. It would be foolish to expect that the democratic welfare 
state with territorial sovereignty will finally turn out as the last step in the evolution of 
protective agencies. Whatever will happen in the future - we should not forget that 
many achievements of former societies, as admirable as they may seem even today, 
were dependent upon activities nowadays regarded as criminal. 1 4 
But most important, social peace cannot be preserved by a political system that is 
economically not viable. One has to bear in mind, that the whole complex of codetermi-
nation and union wage policy amounts to a considerable redistribution in favor of the 
older generation, which aggravates the intergenerational problems inherent in the Ger-
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man social security system. Thus, the conservation of union privileges, codetermina-
tion, and many other institutional devices of modern labor law do not promote social 
peace, as many people still believe, but increase the risks of its breakdown when 
coming generations try to get rid of the burden placed on them by the older generation. 
3. In defense of codetermination, a representative of Volkswagen werk A G reported 
harmonious cooperation between management and the workers' council in an atmo-
sphere of "mutual trust and information" supported by first-class trips around the 
world that enable workers' representatives to get acquainted with foreign production 
techniques on a "parity basis". First of all, this is not a viable defense of mandatory 
codetermination, because in a free market setting no company is prevented from creat-
ing a workers' council and letting its members fly first class around the world. Second 
and more important, the reported harmony seems to be more of a part of business 
ideology than of reality. A leading German business magazine reports a long series of 
plots even within the firm's management and cites as "the most influential clique 
members of the workers' council and union leaders", who were involved in the over-
throw of two chief executive officers in the 1970s (Manager-Magazin 1986: 45). Even if 
one does not believe in everything that can be found in the press, the unusually high 
turnover of chief executive officers is not a sign of "mutual trust and information". 
Moreover, the rhetoric of mutual trust was not what the financial markets acquiesced in 
when it turned out that the firm had lost nearly half a bilion D M in a huge currency 
frand due to entirely insufficient internal controls (Der Spiegel v. 8.6.1987: 27-42). 
But third, and most important, there are data indicating that the firm may have been 
captured by a coalition of incumbent workers at the expense of stockholders, consum-
ers, and the workforce outside the firm. Within the last fifteen years the firm omitted 
four times its dividend and in spite of the sustained economic recovery of the mid-1980s 
domestic employment at the end of 1986 remained below its peak level of 133970 
reached in July 1971, even though the firm operates within an environment charac-
terized by high unemployment rates and pays above-average wages to incumbents. 
These are the typical attributes of a monopoly of organized labor, and the outcomes 
bear resemblance to the economic effects of Yugoslav firms (data from the respective 
annual reports). 
Notes 
1 This measure of asset specifity can be traced back to Marshall (1920: 520, 626). 
2 For a recent defense of the contract "at will", which in the United States is still the predominant 
form of labor contracting in the non-unionized sector, see Epstein (1984). 
3 According to a recent study of Cooper (1984), Japan shows by far the highest mental ill health scores 
among the highly developed countries included in the study (other highly developed countries were 
Sweden, Germany, the United States, and Great Britain). The executive job dissatisfaction score in 
Japan was 34% as compared with 22% in the U.S. and 18% in Germany. Suicide rates among 
middle-aged male Japanese employees have risen by approximately 130% between 1975 and 1984 
(Wirtschaftswoche 1986: 49). 
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4 There is strong evidence that unionization would be insignificant if legally imposed union privileges 
were abolished. See Monissen and Wenger (1987), Reynolds (1984). What may survive in a system 
of free markets are employer-dominated "company unions" which differ markedly from unions in 
the traditional sense. Employer-dominated "unions" serve as an agency of personnel marketing on 
behalf of the firm and are not designed to antagonistic interest representation on behalf of employ-
ees as is traditionally understood of unions in industrialized countries of the West. 
5 This implies that contingent claim trading is ruled out by restrictions of freedom of contract or 
prohibitive transactions costs. Of course, in an Arrow-Debreu-world where ex-post decision rights 
can be dispensed with, free trading of contingent claims always leads to an efficient risk distribution. 
6 For an important decision problem where rather the opposite is true, see Monissen and Wenger 
(1987), section IV, figure 1. 
7 Arbitration in labor conflicts is quite expensive, especially if arbitrators are not subject to external 
control. In Germany, for example, mandatory arbitration in codetermination affairs is a welcome 
source of income for members of the legal profession. Judges of labor courts may appoint themselves 
mutually as chairmen of arbitration commissions. The resulting discretionary power forces employ-
ers to tolerate high arbitration fees. For a day's work as chairman of an arbitration commission a 
judge frequently receives more than his monthly earnings as a civil servant (Schlochauer 1983). 
8 In Germany, the number of lawsuits filed with labor courts has risen dramatically during the last two 
decades (Kotzorek 1985: 312). 
9 The relevant practices are mostly illegal and therefore kept secret, but sometimes emerge in the 
courts. Recently, a court invalidated an election of the members of a workers' council because a 
large automobile manufacturer had financed and otherwise supported the election campaign of 
"friendly" candidates (Arbeitsgericht Berlin v. 8. 8.1984, 18 BV 5/84, employer's appeal denied by 
the Federal Labor Court, 4.12.1986, 6 A B R 48/85, Der Betrieb v. 23.1.1987: 232). The election 
had to be repeated and a group of radical left-wing candidates supported by no less than 43% of the 
voters won a substantial minority of the seats in the workers' council. Since then, the firm is haunted 
by continued labor unrest and permanent struggle between two factions of the work force (Frankfur-
ter Allgemeine Zeitung v. 15.9.1987: 14). This indicates that it is essential for firms to maintain 
"harmonious" relations with the members of the workers' council. It is interesting to note that in the 
United States and Great Britain, where unions have far-reaching privileges on the firm level and on 
the shop floor, corruption among union officials has long been well-documented (see e.g. Taft 1964: 
207-211, 685-705). There is no reason to expect that codetermination rights created in Germany 
during the 1970s will finally lead to different findings. 
10 This is especially true since some courts have acknowledged the right of the workers' council to 
interfere with entrepreneurial decisions through injunction (Eich 1983). 
11 Evidences for declining productivity beyond the age of fourty are pervasive. See, e.g., Dalton and 
Thompson (1971), who show that a drop in performance among middle-aged employees is not 
confined to blue-collar workers, as many people may believe. 
12 This is not to say that the pervasive social custom to overpay older workers can not have other roots 
than unionization. Unions, however, for various reasons, inevitably bring about wage profiles favor-
ing senior workers usually protected by explicit stipulations in the union contract. As a substitute or 
supplement, they promote changes in statutory law on behalf of incumbents. For a more elaborate 
treatment of this point, see Monissen and Wenger 1987, Section 6. 
13 Of course, voluntary participation schemes can be and often are efficient (Michaelis and Picot 1987); 
but this does not speak in favor of legally imposed codetermination schemes, as many people may 
believe. Voluntary participation which can be terminated at a short notice or even at will must not be 
confounded with mandatory codetermination under suspended termination rights. 
14 For a detached analysis of organized violence by protective agencies see Lane 1979. 
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